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A FRACTURED STANDARD: HOW THE 
FOURTH CIRCUIT GRANTED EXPANSIVE 
IMPLIED PROPERTY RIGHTS TO  
MINERAL OWNERS 
DAVIS TRUSLOW* 
Abstract: Extraction of natural gas through hydraulic fracturing poses a sig-
nificant risk of harm to human health and the environment. West Virginia, like 
many states that lie above vast oil and gas resources, grants expansive implied 
property rights to owners of subsurface mineral estates. In Whiteman v. Ches-
apeake, L.L.C., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that a hydraulic fracturing company’s construction and use of drilling waste 
pits on the surface of another’s property did not constitute a trespass under 
West Virginia common law because it was reasonably necessary for the re-
covery of natural gas and did not impose a substantial burden on the surface 
property. This Comment argues that the court’s decision misapplied a com-
mon law standard to a unique set of facts and, as a result, has significantly di-
luted the protections afforded to individual landowners. The court should have 
determined that a permanent disposal of waste on the surface of another’s 
property exceeds the implied rights of mineral estate owners because such a 
use is not necessary. In addition, even if the court had found that such a dis-
posal was necessary, it should have concluded that permanent disposal of 
waste was not reasonable. 
INTRODUCTION 
As Americans struggle to heat their homes and fill their gas tanks, 
many states are relying more heavily on natural gas, one of the few com-
modities that is truly “made-in-America.”1 Hydraulic fracturing (“frack-
ing”) is an increasingly utilized technique for natural gas production in the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 See Monika Ehrman, The Next Great Compromise: A Comprehensive Response to Opposi-
tion Against Shale Gas Development Using Hydraulic Fracturing in the United States, 46 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 423, 425 (2014) (noting expanding reliance on natural gas in residential homes); 
Natural Gas and Its Uses, AM. PETROLEUM INST., http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas-
overview/exploration-and-production/natural-gas/natural-gas-uses [http://perma.cc/RG9D-QXFC] 
(indicating that Americans are using natural gas to heat households and power cars); Natural Gas 
Consumption by End Use, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/
ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm [http://perma.cc/25HY-9VWA] (illustrating a comparative anal-
ysis of state consumption of natural gas). 
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United States.2 Developments in fracking technology have vastly expanded 
onshore natural gas production by making it economically feasible to tap 
reserves that were previously inaccessible.3 The booming fracking industry 
will likely position the United States as the leading world producer of natu-
ral gas by the end of 2015.4 
Onshore natural gas production promotes national energy security and 
stimulates the national economy, while simultaneously providing a cleaner 
alternative to coal.5 As a result, many environmental groups assert that natu-
ral gas is a key step in bridging the gap between traditional high green-
house-gas-emitting fossil fuels and low emission technologies, like renewa-
ble resources.6 Despite its economic benefits, fracking poses a significant 
threat to the environment and human health due to its potential impact on 
the quality and quantity of our nation’s vital water resources.7 
Fracking is the process by which pressurized fluids are pumped 
through natural gas wells8 deep into subsurface rock formations9 to fracture 
the formation and release trapped natural gas.10 A vertical well is drilled 
through the surface, extending thousands of feet until it reaches a natural 
gas storing rock formation, such as shale.11 Once the proper depth is 
reached, the vertical well pivots horizontally, extending through the length 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES, at ES-1 (2015), http://www.
epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/hf_es_erd_jun2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/WM8S-
AQ75] (finding recent technological developments in hydraulic fracking have fostered an increase 
in production and economic benefits); Terry W. Roberson, Environmental Concerns of Hydrau-
lically Fracturing a Natural Gas Well, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 67 (2012) (noting that frack-
ing is “the leading trend in onshore natural gas exploration and production”). 
 3 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2. 
 4 Ehrman, supra note 1, at 423, 425. 
 5 See id. at 427. Natural gas-fired power plants produce roughly half the carbon dioxide emis-
sions of coal-fired plants. Id. 
 6 See id.; Roberson, supra note 2, at 68. 
 7 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2. 
 8 See Ehrman, supra note 1, at 431–32. Wells are large cylindrical holes drilled through the 
surface, deep into the earth, to reach a natural gas-storing rock formation. Id. The wells act as 
conduits, allowing natural gas to flow out of the rock formations, into the well, and up to the sur-
face for collection. See id. 
 9 See Roberson, supra note 2, at 69–70. Shale rock formations are major sources and reser-
voirs of natural gas in the United States. Id. at 69. Shale, a fine-grained sedimentary rock formed 
by the compaction of silt and clay-sized mineral particles, breaks easily into thin pieces along 
many thin layers and produces gas composed of methane. Id. 
 10 Id. at 70; see Ehrman, supra note 1, at 433 (describing generally the production process). 
 11 See Ehrman, supra note 1, at 431; Roberson, supra note 2, at 70. Shale formations, which 
date back to the Mississippian age, a sub-period in the geologic timescale, are 6500 to 8500 feet 
deep with a thickness ranging from a hundred to 600 feet. Roberson, supra note 2, at 70. The Mar-
cellus Shale, which covers 95,000 square miles across southern New York, Pennsylvania, western 
Maryland, eastern Ohio, and West Virginia, is a middle Devonian age formation that is 4000 to 
8500 feet deep and ranges in thickness from fifty to 200 feet. Id. 
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of the formation.12 After the well is fully drilled and prepared,13 fluids are 
injected into the well at high pressures to fracture the surrounding shale 
formation.14 The fracking fluids are then pumped back out of the well, al-
lowing natural gas to flow into the well from the newly created fractures, 
and then up to the surface for collection.15 
A major risk factor identified by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and a primary concern of many landowners with property located 
near fracking wells, is that the fracking production and waste disposal pro-
cesses can severely contaminate the United States’ limited water re-
sources.16 Well construction and operation produces large quantities of solid 
and liquid waste, including spent fracking fluids (“flowback”), drill cuttings, 
and mud.17 Fracking fluids are generally composed of water (90%), prop-
pant (9.5%), and chemical additives (0.5%).18 Each well requires millions 
of gallons of water that, once mixed with these chemical additives, are ren-
dered undrinkable and hazardous to the environment.19 In a recent study, 
EPA identified 1076 chemical additives used in the fracking process and 
determined that human consumption of many of these chemicals could 
manifest negative health effects, including carcinogenesis, immune system 
effects, changes in blood chemistry, neurotoxicity, liver and kidney toxicity, 
and reproductive and developmental toxicity.20 In the United States, thou-
sands of wells are drilled and fractured each year, with an estimated 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Ehrman, supra note 1, at 431. 
 13 See id. at 431, 433. After the well is drilled, it is lined with a steel casing and cemented to 
isolate and protect groundwater. Id. at 431. Next, a perforating gun is inserted into the well and 
uses explosive charges to create holes in the casing, the surrounding cement, and the shale for-
mation. Id. at 432. 
 14 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2. 
 15 Ehrman, supra note 1, at 433. 
 16 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at ES-6, ES-19 to -21; see also Whiteman v. Chesa-
peake Appalachia, L.L.C. (Whiteman II), 729 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the plain-
tiffs are concerned about the environmental effects of the waste pits). The EPA also identified four 
other concerns: withdrawing water during times of low water availability; spilling contaminated 
fracking fluids; fracking directly into below-ground drinking water resources; and fluids migrating 
below ground. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at ES-6. 
 17 See Ehrman, supra note 1, at 433–34; Austin C. Whitmore, Note, Oilfield Recycling in 
Texas: Why Command and Control Regulations Are Stifling the End Goal, 44 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 
287, 289–90 (2014). Once the formation is fractured and the fracking fluids are extracted from the 
well, flowback is collected at the surface. See Ehrman, supra note 1, at 433. Generally, far less 
than fifty percent of the fracking fluids are extracted from the well. Id. at 434. The drilling process 
also produces large amounts of solid and liquid waste, including drill cutting and mud. See 
Whitmore, supra, at 290. 
 18 Roberson, supra note 2, at 75. Proppant is a material, usually sand, that is added to the 
fracking fluid to prop open the fractures and allow the natural gas to flow out. Id. 
 19 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at ES-6, ES-12 to -13. 
 20 See id. at ES-12 to -13. 
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100,000 to 120,000 new wells fractured between 2011 and 2014 alone.21 
Between 2011 and 2012, 88 billion gallons of water were directly contami-
nated through fracking activities.22 
Lisa and Martin Whiteman (the “Whitemans”) were members of a 
large group of at least 9.4 million U.S. citizens who live near fracking 
wells.23 The Whitemans were West Virginia landowners who raised sheep 
and grew hay on the surface of approximately 101 acres of land.24 Their 
property rested atop the Marcellus Shale, one of the largest shale formations 
in the United States.25 As is common in states with vast quantities of miner-
al resources, the mineral estate beneath the Whitemans’ 101 acres was split 
from the surface estate.26 As a result, the Whitemans owned the surface 
while Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (“Chesapeake”) held the rights to the 
subsurface mineral estate pursuant to a lease agreement between Chesa-
peake and a third party.27 Chesapeake, the second-largest producer of natu-
ral gas in the United States, operated three natural gas wells on the surface 
of the Whitemans’ property.28 
The Whitemans were primarily concerned with Chesapeake’s disposal 
of waste produced from the construction and use of these wells on their sur-
face property.29 Stored in open pits on the surface property, the waste in-
cluded drill cuttings, mud, and chemical additives.30 The use of open pits 
for waste disposal was a common disposal method employed by Chesa-
peake in West Virginia at the time the wells were drilled.31 Alternative dis-
posal methods, such as “closed-loop” systems, however, were used by 
Chesapeake in other areas of the country.32 Although Chesapeake did not 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See id. at ES-5 (calculating the total amount of new wells over the entire period by combin-
ing the average annual increases). 
 22 See id. at ES-6 to -7. While this represents only one percent of the nation’s total annual 
water use, the impact is much greater at the local level. See id. 
 23 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the Whitemans live on 101 
acres of land where Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. operates three natural gas wells); ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at ES-5 to -6 (stating that at least 9.4 million residents live within 
one square mile of a fracking well). 
 24 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 382–83. 
 25 See id. at 383; Roberson, supra note 2, at 70. 
 26 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 382–83; see also Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 906 
F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (N.D. W. Va. 2012) (noting that the deed severed the mineral estate from 
surface estate by deed); Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 539–40 (1874) (imply-
ing that the mineral estate was severed from surface estate by warranty deed). 
 27 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 383. 
 28 Id. at 381, 383; About, CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, http://www.chk.com/about [http://perma.cc/
CDN9-CQVS]. 
 29 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 384. 
 30 Id. at 383–84. 
 31 Id. at 384. 
 32 Id. 
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begin implementing the alternative, closed-loop system in West Virginia 
until 2009, Chesapeake had used it in Oklahoma since 2004 and Texas since 
2005.33 In the closed-loop system, the drilling company removes drill cut-
tings and waste from the well location for disposal in off-site landfills.34 
The closed-loop system allows more of the expensive and toxic drilling flu-
id to be reused in future drilling operations, removes the possibility of a pit 
failure and the resulting contamination, and creates a smaller overall drill-
ing operation footprint at the well site.35 On the other hand, closed-loop sys-
tems are generally more expensive to implement.36 
In Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed that permanent disposal of 
drill cuttings and other waste products from the operation of three natural 
gas wells stored by the holder of subsurface mineral rights in open surface 
pits did not constitute a trespass under West Virginia law.37 The court rea-
soned that such disposal was reasonably necessary for the extraction of nat-
ural gas, in part due to the valid permits possessed by Chesapeake.38 This 
Comment argues that the court’s decision misapplied a common law stand-
ard to a unique set of facts and, as a result, has significantly diluted the pro-
tections afforded to individual landowners.39 The court should have deter-
mined that a permanent disposal of waste on the surface of another’s prop-
erty exceeds the implied rights afforded to holders of mineral rights because 
such a use is unnecessary.40 The existence of alternative disposal methods 
effectively removed the necessity of permanent disposal on the Whitemans’ 
property.41 In addition, even if the court found that such disposal was neces-
sary, it should have concluded that permanent disposal of waste was unrea-
sonable.42 If the court had properly applied the language of the common law 
standard, the court would have concluded that Chesapeake’s use of the 
Whitemans’ surface property was not reasonably necessary for Chesa-
peake’s enjoyment of the mineral estate and, therefore, constituted a tres-
pass.43 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.; see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at ES-6, ES-12 to -13. 
 36 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 384. 
 37 See id. at 394 (inferring that the waste disposal did not constitute a trespass on the 
Whitemans’ property because it was reasonably necessary and, therefore, Chesapeake had lawful 
authority to dispose its fracking waste). 
 38 See id. at 392–94. 
 39 See infra note 85–121 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra note 99–121 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra note 99–121 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra note 99–121 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra note 99–121 and accompanying text. 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Lisa and Martin Whiteman owned the surface rights to approximately 
101 acres of land in Wetzel County, West Virginia, where they lived, grew 
hay, and raised sheep.44 Two severance deeds, dated 1952 and 1965, split 
the mineral estate from the surface estate, thereby allowing the surface and 
subsurface rights of the property to be held separately.45 The severance 
deeds were broad, neither reserving any specific rights to the mineral estate 
owner nor addressing permanent waste disposal on the surface.46 Pursuant 
to a lease agreement from the third party owner of the subsurface rights, 
Chesapeake held the subsurface mineral rights to the property.47 
Before fracking operations began, Chesapeake obtained well work and 
discharge permits from the West Virginia Department of Environmental 
Protection (“WVDEP”) for the construction and management of the wells.48 
Chesapeake gave the Whitemans notice of its intent to drill and dispose of 
waste on the property.49 The WVDEP permit application attached to the no-
tice stated that Chesapeake intended to dispose of waste, including drill cut-
tings, in surface pits.50 Drilling operations produced a large volume of drill 
cuttings, mud, and chemical additives, all of which were disposed of in two 
open, lined pits on the surface property.51 After drilling was completed, 
Chesapeake removed the plastic liner from the pits and buried the contami-
nated waste by mixing it with clean soil from the surface.52 
Chesapeake’s well operations and waste disposal pits rendered ten acres 
of the Whitemans’ surface property “unusable for any suitable purpose.”53 
Nevertheless, Chesapeake’s appraiser testified that the property had suffered 
no diminution or loss in value as a result of Chesapeake’s operations.54 
Moreover, the Whitemans admitted that their monetary damages were “not 
real significant.”55 The Whitemans originally sought to enforce their proper-
ty rights through a number of tort law claims, but subsequently voluntarily 
dismissed all of them except their claim for common law trespass.56 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d 381, 382–83 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 45 See Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (Whiteman I), 873 F. Supp. 2d 767, 770 
(N.D. W. Va. 2012). 
 46 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 383. 
 47 See id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. at 383–84, 383 n.3. 
 52 Id. at 384. 
 53 Id. at 383. 
 54 Id. at 384. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See id. at 385. 
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The Whitemans filed their trespass action in the Circuit Court of Wet-
zel County, West Virginia and Chesapeake removed it to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia on the basis of di-
versity of citizenship.57 The parties cross-moved for partial summary judg-
ment on the trespass claim.58 The court denied the Whitemans’ motion and 
granted Chesapeake’s motion, holding that Chesapeake’s construction and 
use of drill waste pits on the Whitemans’ property did not constitute a tres-
pass under West Virginia law.59 The Whitemans appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.60 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In the 1945 decision, Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered, inter alia, whether a lumber 
company’s transportation of lumber across the plaintiff’s tramway consti-
tuted a trespass even if the damages were merely negligible and reparable.61 
Notably, the court defined trespass as “an entry on another man’s ground 
without lawful authority” that caused damage, however slight, “to his real 
property.”62 Drawing on that definition, the court reasoned that the protec-
tion of property rights would not be denied solely because damages were 
merely negligible.63 As a result, the lumber company’s use of the tramway 
was held to constitute a trespass.64 
In many states with rich mineral resources, it is common for a proper-
ty’s surface rights to be split from the subsurface mineral rights and held 
separately.65 In Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., an 1874 decision, the 
Court of Appeals of New York considered the extent to which the owner of 
subsurface mineral rights, reserved through deed and located beneath pri-
vately owned surface property, may use the surface for the extraction of 
minerals.66 The Brewster Mining Company owned and operated an iron ore 
mine beneath the plaintiff’s surface property.67 To facilitate its mining oper-
ations, Brewster Mining Company permanently erected a blacksmith shop, 
a powder house for storing blasting materials, and a stable for horses on the 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Whiteman I, 873 F. Supp. 2d 767, 769 (N.D. W. Va. 2012). 
 58 Id. 
 59 See id. at 770, 777, 779. 
 60 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 382. 
 61 Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 348, 350–52 (W. Va. 1945). 
 62 Id. at 352. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 350, 355. 
 65 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 383; Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 906 F. Supp. 2d 
519, 522 (N.D. W. Va. 2012); Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 539–40 (1874). 
 66 See Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 538–40. 
 67 See id. 
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plaintiff’s surface land.68 In addition, the company stored ore, rubbish, and 
refuse on the surface for several years, constructed a steam engine to run the 
mine, and created a large hole for mine access.69 
The court held that a reservation by deed of mineral rights constitutes a 
constructive grant that, unless explicitly restricted by the deed, carries an 
implied right to use the surface to the extent that it is necessary for the rea-
sonable enjoyment of the mineral estate.70 Therefore, a mineral owner has the 
implied right to penetrate the surface to extract minerals in such a “manner as 
is convenient and advantageous to the owner of the right,” without rendering 
the surface “wholly destroyed.”71 The mineral owner’s right to use the sur-
face, however, is limited to what is “necessary,” not only convenient.72 The 
court reasoned that necessity must precede convenience, noting that a mineral 
owner does not have the right to use the surface property merely “because it 
is convenient for him, unless it is first necessary.”73 The court further found 
that “considerations of vital economy” seldom create necessity.74 Although 
the court reversed the lower court’s judgment and ordered a new trial in order 
to apply the newly established “reasonably necessary” standard to the facts, 
the court found that “[i]t is very rare[]” that a mine owner can “justify the use 
of the surface for . . . the long-continued deposit of the rubbish . . . .”75 
In the 1909 decision, Porter v. Mack Manufacturing Co., the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted the reasonably necessary stand-
ard established in Marvin.76 In Porter, the mineral owner sought an injunc-
tion to stop the surface owner from blocking its construction of a tramway 
through the surface.77 The court held that using the surface was necessary 
for ore mining and that a tramway was a suitable means for reaching the 
necessary outcome.78 In its decision, the Porter court reiterated that a ne-
cessity must precede a suitable, convenient, or reasonable result.79 
In the 1980 decision, Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of West Virginia applied the reasonable necessary standard and 
emphasized the distinction between express and implied rights of mineral 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See id. at 540–41. 
 69 See id. at 540–42. 
 70 See id. at 538. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. The court observed that a mineral owner can take necessary actions in a convenient 
manner. Id. 
 73 Id. at 553 (emphasis added). 
 74 Id. at 538, 554. 
 75 Id. at 553, 565. 
 76 See Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 853, 854–55 (W. Va. 1909). 
 77 See id. at 853. 
 78 See id. at 855. 
 79 See Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 553; Porter, 64 S.E. at 854–55. 
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owners.80 In Buffalo Mining Co., the surface owner interfered with the min-
eral owner’s construction of a power line through the surface for the pur-
pose of powering mine ventilation.81 The court concluded that when a min-
eral owner acts under implied rights not expressly granted by deed, “the test 
of what is reasonable and necessary becomes more exacting . . . .”82 There-
fore, the right must be reasonably necessary for the extraction of the miner-
als and may only be exercised “without any substantial burden to the sur-
face owner.”83 Although the court affirmed the reasonable necessary stand-
ard and established an additional “undue burden” requirement, it did not 
apply the standard because those issues were not raised at trial.84 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia L.L.C., the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Chesapeake Appalachia, 
L.L.C.’s (“Chesapeake”) construction and use of drilling waste pits on Lisa 
and Martin Whiteman’s (the “Whitemans”) surface property did not consti-
tute a trespass under West Virginia common law because it was reasonably 
necessary for the recovery of natural gas and did not impose a substantial 
burden on the Whitemans’ surface property.85 Under West Virginia common 
law, a trespass occurs when one enters onto or leaves something on the land 
of another’s property without lawful authority.86 Lawful authority can be 
obtained by license or agreement, such as a lease or deed.87 A line of prece-
dent, extending from Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., established that a 
grant of subsurface mineral rights in a property carries with it an implied 
right to use the surface to the extent that it is reasonably necessary for the 
use and enjoyment of the mineral estate without substantially burdening the 
surface owner.88 As a result, the court determined that the owner of mineral 
rights beneath a surface property has implied lawful authority to enter onto 
and leave things on another’s property to the extent that it is reasonably 
necessary.89 
The court held that, pursuant to a lease agreement with the owner of 
the mineral rights beneath the Whitemans’ surface property, Chesapeake 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 721, 725–26 (W. Va. 1980). 
 81 See id. at 722. 
 82 Id. at 725. 
 83 Id. at 725–26. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d 381, 394 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 86 See Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 348, 352 (W. Va. 1945). 
 87 Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 387. 
 88 See id. at 387, 394; Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 538 (1874); Buffalo 
Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 721; Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 853, 854 (W. Va. 1909). 
 89 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 394. 
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had lawful authority to construct and use waste pits on the surface because 
this use was reasonably necessary and did not substantially burden the 
Whitemans.90 The court first determined that the waste pits did not substan-
tially burden the Whitemans.91 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied 
on testimony from Chesapeake’s expert who asserted that the Whitemans’ 
property had suffered no diminution as a result of the waste pits.92 In addi-
tion, the court specifically noted that the Whitemans admitted at trial that 
their damages were “not real significant” despite also acknowledging that 
the pits rendered ten acres of the surface no longer “suitable for any pur-
pose.”93 The court emphasized that because the Whitemans failed to present 
sufficient evidence and rebut Chesapeake’s expert’s testimony, they were 
unable to meet the burden of proof necessary to show that the waste pits 
were a substantial burden.94 As a result, the Whitemans could only establish 
that Chesapeake lacked lawful authority by showing that the waste pits 
were not reasonably necessary.95 
Next, the court concluded that the waste pits were reasonably neces-
sary for Chesapeake’s extraction of minerals because Chesapeake had valid 
permits for the waste pits and because the pits were a common method for 
waste disposal in the area.96 Before Chesapeake began drilling, it obtained 
valid permits from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (“WVDEP”), which specifically listed onsite waste pit disposal as the 
expected disposal method.97 In addition, the court determined that onsite 
waste pits were a reasonable method for disposal because, though a “closed-
loop” method was also available, it was more expensive to implement and 
was not used by Chesapeake in West Virginia at the time the pits were con-
structed.98 
Although there are many cases that discuss the implied rights of a 
mineral owner, Whiteman was the first case to specifically address the con-
struction and use of waste disposal pits for drill cuttings and other drilling 
waste materials.99 In reaching its decision, however, the court misapplied 
the reasonably necessary standard, significantly weakening the standard laid 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See id. at 383, 394. 
 91 See id. at 392. 
 92 Id. at 384, 392. 
 93 Id. at 383–84. 
 94 See id. at 392. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See id. at 392–93. 
 97 Id. at 383. 
 98 Id. at 392–93. 
 99 Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 906 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (N.D. W. Va. 2012). 
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out by the Marvin court.100 The court should have first determined whether 
or not onsite disposal of waste was necessary before it even considered rea-
sonableness.101 If it had done so, the court would have found that onsite 
disposal was unnecessary due to the existence of an alternative disposal 
method.102 Second, even if the court had found that onsite disposal was nec-
essary, the court should have given more weight to the explicit language of 
the court in Marvin and determined that permanent waste disposal on the 
surface was unreasonable.103 If the court had vigorously applied the lan-
guage of the Marvin standard, the court would have held that Chesapeake’s 
use of the surface was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the 
mineral estate.104 
The court in Marvin emphasized that necessity is what gives rise to 
implied surface rights and, therefore, necessity must precede a considera-
tion of reasonableness.105 The court states that, “[T]he rights which follow 
ownership as incident thereto, are no more nor greater than those which are 
necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the property.”106 In Whiteman, 
however, the court applied a combined standard that failed to distinguish 
between necessity and reasonableness.107 This part-necessity and part-
reasonableness standard enabled the court to over-emphasize the existence 
of valid permits, which should not have been a consideration in determining 
necessity, and under-emphasize the existence of alternative disposal meth-
                                                                                                                           
 100 Compare Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 392–94 (concluding that permanent waste disposal 
does not exceed the implied rights of a mineral owner because it is reasonably necessary despite 
the existence of alternative disposal methods), with Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 
538, 538 (1874) (stating that long-continued or permanent disposal of refuse on the surface ex-
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eration of reasonableness or convenience). 
 101 See Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 (Colo. 1997) (concluding that 
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first be necessity before a consideration of reasonableness or convenience of surface use). 
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 103 See Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 538 (“It is very rarely, then, that a case arises where, upon this test, 
the mine owner can justify the use of the surface for the lengthened keeping of his ore . . . [and] 
more rarely, for the long-continued deposit of the rubbish . . . .”); see also Hooper v. Dora Coal 
Mining Co., 10 So. 652, 653 (Ala. 1892) (deciding that prolonged use of the surface for disposal 
of refuse from mineral operations was trespass); Lanahan v. Myers, 389 P.2d 92, 93 (Okla. 1963) 
(concluding that the failure to use surface waste pits for a prolonged period of time was longer 
than reasonably necessary). 
 104 See Hooper, 10 So. at 653–54; Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp., 946 P.2d at 927; Marvin, 55 N.Y. 
at 538; Lanahan, 389 P.2d at 93. 
 105 See Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 538. 
 106 Id. at 552. 
 107 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d 381, 392–93 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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ods.108 Although it is undoubtedly necessary that Chesapeake needed to se-
lect a waste disposal method, the existence of a less invasive alternative 
should have been given more weight by the court.109 
If the court had first determined necessity, the court would have found 
that Chesapeake’s use of onsite disposal was unnecessary due to Chesa-
peake’s ability to implement a close-loop disposal system.110 Although 
Chesapeake did not use the closed-loop system in West Virginia or in any 
eastern state at the time the wells were drilled, Chesapeake did use the sys-
tem in Texas and Oklahoma and, therefore, the closed-loop system was a 
feasibly available alternative method.111 The closed-loop system, however, 
would have been more expensive to implement.112 Nevertheless, the court 
in Marvin stated that, “[I]t is seldom that considerations of vital economy 
can create a necessity.”113 In addition, the increased costs of implementation 
would have been offset by better preservation of expensive drilling mud for 
future drilling operations, elimination of the possibility of a pit failure, re-
duction of the drilling operation’s footprint at the well site, and prevention 
of future environmental contamination.114 
Even if the court had determined that, despite the availability of the 
closed-loop system, the onsite waste pits were necessary, the court should 
not have concluded that permanent waste disposal on the surface was rea-
sonable.115 In reaching its decision, the court relied too heavily on Chesa-
peake’s valid waste pit permits from the WVDEP and on common industry 
practices, ignoring the prohibitive language in Marvin and other precedent 
extending therefrom.116 In Marvin, the court emphasized that long-term dis-
posal of waste on the surface would exceed the mineral owner’s rights, stat-
ing that it would be rare “that a case arises where, upon this test, the [min-
eral right] owner can justify the use of the surface for the lengthened keep-
                                                                                                                           
 108 See id. (considering the existence of WVDEP permits and common industry practice, 
while discounting the existence of the closed-loop method in conducting reasonably necessary 
analysis). 
 109 See Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp., 946 P.2d at 927. 
 110 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 392–93; Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp., 946 P.2d at 927; Marvin, 
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 111 See Whiteman II, 729 F.3d at 384. 
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 115 See Hooper v. Dora Coal Mining Co., 10 So. 652, 653–54 (Ala. 1892); Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 
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ing” of waste and “more rarely, for the long-continued deposit of the rub-
bish . . . .”117 Permanent or long-term disposal of waste on the surface cre-
ates a prolonged burden on the surface owner that is not reasonably neces-
sary for the extraction of minerals because the burden can remain even after 
cessation of mineral operations.118 Therefore, the Whiteman court should 
have determined that the permanent disposal of waste on the surface was 
not reasonably necessary for Chesapeake’s enjoyment of the mineral estate 
and imposed an undue burden on the Whitemans.119 
The court’s decision significantly weakens the reasonably necessary 
standard by transforming it into a mere reasonableness analysis.120 As a re-
sult, the court’s conclusion in Whiteman heavily favors expansive mineral 
rights at the expense of restricting the rights of surface owners.121 
CONCLUSION 
 Natural gas production through hydraulic fracturing poses a serious 
risk to public health due to its potential to contaminate water with many 
highly toxic chemicals. In Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that permanent 
disposal of certain fracking waste in surface pits did not exceed the implied 
rights of a mineral owner. This decision significantly weakens the reasona-
bly necessary standard, affording extensive implied rights to mineral own-
ers, while greatly reducing a surface owner’s ability to protect himself from 
the many risks associated with fracking operations. In applying the stand-
ard, the court failed to distinguish between necessity and reasonableness 
and deviated too far from Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co. when reach-
ing its conclusion. The court should have followed Marvin’s standard and 
held that it was unnecessary for Chesapeake to permanently dispose of 
waste in onsite pits due to the existence of alternative disposal methods. 
Lacking necessity, the court should not have considered reasonableness. But 
even if the court had determined that onsite disposal was necessary, the 
court should not have reached the conclusion that such a use of the surface 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 553. 
 118 See Hooper, 10 So. at 653 (concluding that the deposit of refuse on the surface constituted 
a trespass lacking continued necessity); Marvin, 55 N.Y. at 538; Lanahan, 389 P.2d at 93 (decid-
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 119 See Hooper, 10 So. at 653; Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 (Colo. 
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666 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:653 
was reasonable. Although Whiteman was the first time a court considered 
the specific factual situation in which a mineral right owner was permanent-
ly disposing of drill cuttings and waste in open surface pits, courts have 
consistently found that permanent disposal of refuse, trash, and other waste 
on the surface is not within the implied mineral rights created through a 
deed. The court’s decision creates a precedent that will force future courts to 
allow mineral owners to subvert the rights of surface owners. 
